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ABSTRACT
Whenever a bug occurs in a program, software developers
assume that the code is flawed, not the compiler. In fact,
if compilers should be correct, they are just normal soft-
ware with their own bugs. Hard to find, errors in them have
significant impact, since it could result to vulnerabilities,
especially when they silently miscompile a critical applica-
tion. Using assembly language to write such software is quite
common, especially when time constraint is involved in such
program.
This paper exposes a bug found in Microsoft Macro As-
sembler (ml for short) compiler, developed by Microsoft
since 1981. This assembly has the characteristics to get
high level-like constructs and high level-like records which
help the developer to write assembly code. It is in the man-
agement of one of this level-like construct the bug has been
found.
This study aims to show how a compiler-bug can be au-
dited and possibly corrected. For application developers, it
shows that even old and mature compilers can present bugs.
For security researcher, it shows possibilities to hide some
unexpected behavior in software with a clear and officially
non-bogus code. It highlights opportunities for including
stealth backdoors even in open-source software.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Compilers are piece of software designed to build new
software according to their source code. It exists a lot and
most famous ones have made most famous software. It
exists compilers for every compiled language, such as C#,
C++, C and assembly. The last is one of the eldest one,
not often used except in critical projects where efficiency
and low design consideration must be strongly taken into
account.
Write assembly code directly is reputed to be hard and
complicated. Every facility provided by more abstract
languages are not present and implementing simple algo-
rithms can be a complicated task for developers. There
exists different assembly syntaxes (AT&T and Intel for
the most famous ones) and different languages, such as
GoAsm, NASM or MASM. The last one, MASM [1] which
stands for Microsoft Macro Assembler [2], is famous by
the ease it provides, since 1981, to implement programs
thanks to the use of its macro code [3]. If this ease helps
everyday development, this one must be reliable since it
rules what programs are supposed to do. In other word,
the compiler must not perform any error since these ones
are very complicated to find. Indeed, when a bug occurs,
the first reflex is about to search from source code and
not blaming the compiler. Source code defines the logic
the program is supposed to follow. And error coming
from a correct source code which would result in an unex-
pected behavior could be very hard to find. Compilers are
supposed to be reliable since software logic depends on them.
Compilers bugs are more common than what is usually
thought [4, 5]. A paper [6] about statistics on bugs’ compil-
ers examined about five thousand ones on a decade’s span.
Technical explanations about such bugs had already been
performed for C language [7, 8], for instance. Compilers’
bugs come from implementation erros, undifined behaviour
in programming languages or unfortunate optimization
made by the compiler [9]. When such errors are found, they
must be reported as soon as possible since software can
be targeted by unexpected logic problems. But, it could
be interesting to imagine how an attacker could exploit
such a default. Indeed, open source software are supposed
to be secure because everyone can check the source code
for unexpected behavior. However an attacker, from a
full legitimate open source code, could use a flaw in the
compiler to run, at execution time, unexpected features in
contradiction of what was originally written in the source
code. Different from Unix backdoor [10], this one is close
to what is explained in [11]. Hidden from a trap present in
the compiler (deliberatly [12] or not), the goal is about to
hide the malicious purpose of a program despite its clean
source code. Such bugs — designed to build backdoors
— can be found with dedicated processes [13] or by the
developer when facing an impossible bug in his/her program.
This is the aim of the article since it proposes in section 2
to show and explain a bug in ml compiler — masm compiler
coming from Microsoft Visual Studio software. Then, in
section 3 would be interesting to explain how an attacker
could exploit it. Finally, conclusion about this disclosure
will be described.
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2. MACRO ASSEMBLY AND ML MIS-
TAKE WITH BOOLEAN NEGATION
OPERATOR
Assembly language is less complicated than people think.
Not far from C language, management of the stack, calling
convention and program’s control flow by conditions and
loops are main differences from a technical point of view.
This is the last point which is interesting in our case. In
C, writing conditions is quite simple and the same can be
performed with assembly language, as displayed in figure 1.
(a) Simple C condition
(b) Equivalent assembly code.
Figure 1: Equivalent code in C and assembly.
To understand the assembly code, the reader must take
into account that local values are stored on the stack in
x86 assembly and, in our example, are referenced from
ebp register used as base pointer. Cmp instruction can
be viewed as the subtraction between two values with the
content of each variable preserved (only the resulting eflag
register is modified, according to the operation). In case of
equality, the difference is zero, otherwise it is not, which
explains why jne (jump not equal) instruction is used there.
For obvious reasons, it is more interesting to write algo-
rithms than technical codes, macro assembly such as MASM
provides facilities for developers to help them in conditions
writing. Something equivalent, close to C language, can be
written.
Figure 2: Macro assembly condition with MASM.
Easier to read, useful for long development, this code
is halfway between C and assembly code (note the use of
brackets do not change complexity here). Compiled with
ml and disassembled with a debugger such as Windbg,
the result is provided in the figure 3.
The code is built in order to force the program to jump at
0x010b1045 if one of the condition is not met. Otherwise,
Figure 3: Disassembly of code in figure 2.
the program continues its normal flow to reach 0x010b1044.
In addition to AND conditions, MASM can build OR or
NOT operators [14]. In the following example, we build two
codes to illustrate the action of the NOT operators from
macro assembly to generated op-codes by the ml compiler.
On the left column, we test whether the value stored in eax
is different from zero or not. If it is not, instruction add
ebp, 4 is executed. Otherwise, we go to the following nop
instruction. On the right column, the condition is negated, it
means if the value stored in eax is zero, then, the instruction
add ebp, 4 is now executed.
Figure 4: Effect of NOT operator with MASM.
The test operation is performed by or eax, eax1 instruc-
tion in both cases. This specific operation could look like
a no operation since it is not supposed to perform any
modification on eax content. That is the goal in a sense
it preserves the content of the value but set specific flags
in eflag register to allow conditional instruction to works
according to the content of eax, especially if eax is zero or
not.
The difference comes in the conditional jump instruction
which is performed right after. In the first case, je which
stands for ”jump near if equal” means that jump operation
is performed when flag zero is set to one (ZF=1). In other
word, if the result of or eax, eax would set ZF to one if eax
was zero. In such a case, the jump will be executed and the
instruction provided if condition is met would be skipped
(going to nop instruction). Or course, if content of eax is
different from zero, the instructions inside the if statement
are executed.
For the second case, the conditional jump is now jne
which is the opposite version of je. The condition is met
when the zero flag is set to zero (ZF=0). From a logic point
of view, it is a negation of the first case. Until that point,
everything works correctly as it is supposed to be.
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Issues come when we raise the level of complexity in
conditions. Consider the following conditions:
Figure 5: Use of NOT operator in conditions.
For obvious reasons, all of them are supposed to produce
different results, according to the values stored in eax and
ebx. Technically speaking, a condition such as (eax ==
!ebx) could be rewritten as (eax == (ebx == 0)) to be more
understandable. The same applies for ((!eax) == ebx) and
the use or the lack of brackets do not change anything for
the compiler. Because all conditions are different, they all
should be computed differently (use of different op-codes or
conditional jumps, for instance) because each describes a
different condition to be met. The main question stands
in the following disassembly of these conditions where all
conditions are compiled in the exactly same way.
Figure 6: Disassembly of code compiled in figure 5.
Each condition is built in the same manner (cmp eax, ebx
followed by a conditional jump if not equal — jne — to the
next condition) despite the fact they are different. From
the ml compiler point of view, eax == ebx is the same as
(!eax) == ebx. Any debugging session is enough to confirm
that the logic written originally in the source code is not
respected at generation time by the compiler.
To prove an error is made by ml compiler, we wrote
an equivalent code in C, compiled it with visual studio
compiler and reversed it with IDA software1. The C
equivalent code is written with the constraint to retrieve
two values from the user. Doing so, no one could object
1https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/
compiler could have made any optimization in the backyard.
Figure 7: C code supposed to test NOT condition.
Decompiled code is a piece of cake to check how the com-
piler built this source code.
Figure 8: Decompiled code from the one compiled
in figure 7.
Difference with the code compiled with ml is blatant.
The first block of code is dedicated to retrieve values from
the user. Then, the first condition (a == !b) is computed
by the use of a temporary value stored on the stack.
Indeed, according to the value of b, a temporary local
value is set to one or zero (second and third block) to be
finally compared to a value at the end. In other words,
the negation of b is stored in a shadow local value to be
used in the comparison next. The same applies for the
next condition (in such a case, it is the value a which is used).
According to what the C compiler did, there is an issue
with ml compiler. Note C compiler uses a temporary value
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to compute the negation of one value, what ml compiler
does not. An explanation could sit in the lack of capacity
of ml to build its own local values as one developer could
craft his/her own ones.
Finally, ml’s bug resides in the use of negation operator
in an equality (or inequality) test. Every code which fol-
lows the pattern !register sign register/memory is eligible to
be incorrectly compiled. This bug is introduced by a bad
management of the value negated. Indeed, the use of NOT
operator changes the content of the value inside the condi-
tion. Out of the condition, the negated value is not supposed
to be altered. The lack of use of temporary values leads to
misinterpret the condition, resulting to the bug. Note that
regular negation from a single value (for instance: ”.if !eax”)
or a full condition (such as: ”.if !(condition)”) work perfectly
fine since it is the test instruction or the conditional jump
which is impacted in that case.
3. HOW TO BUILD A SNEAKY BACK-
DOORWITH ML COMPILER BUG?
3.1 Context of the backdoor
If it is possible to exploit the bug to execute unexpected
code despite official logic of the source code, a backdoor is
writable. The goal is to get an official source code which
should pass a code review from anyone (expert or not). Of
course, reverse engineering compiled code from application
would be enough to find the mistake we included in the
logic flow of the process... But who cares about reversing
open-source application that you can compile by yourself
? Of course, because we modify original source code,
source code of the targeted application must be accessible.
Open-source software are perfect target for that.
As described in [11], two plots are available to build the
backdoor. First, you own the project you want to backdoor.
On the positive side, it makes it easy to introduce the
backdoor since you are the main leader developer. On the
negative side, if the backdoor is found, you lose and here
comes consequences on your reputation. To reduce the
possible cost, the second plot is about to propose a patch
for an existing software. It allows you to patch several
open-source projects since you can act as an occasional
contributor. It is stealthier, in the sense you are not on
first line. In addition, you get the benefit to possibly argue
it was a plausible mistake instead of a malicious intent by
design. In all cases, attack is performed through a modifica-
tion of an existing software to detour it is original procedure.
The main part, about the modification we submit, is
about to not raise a security issue. First, no inspection
(from human to full formal verification) of code would
be able to detect a security breach in the code since the
official security logic is respected. Then, the bug we exploit
avoids questions about a dubious (or, at best, a nonsense)
functionality inserted in code. After all, we are fooling the
logic of conditions in a sneaky way (a condition supposed
to be false is going to be interpreted finally, as true) so that
code, which is supposed to reject something, now, accepts it.
Even if the code is detected, it is still possible to deny any
responsibility in the vulnerability found. The logic of checks
in the original code is supposed to be true and you were not
supposed to know the debugger had a bug. At worst, one
can blame you not to have tested your software enough. Of
course, with an example as simple as the one provided in
figure 9, it can be complicated to argue we did not test it.
But more complex cases can be implemented.
3.2 Description of bug consequences for back-
dooring
Formally speaking, the bug in the compiler does not take
into account the NOT operator in context of equal checks.
The legitimate use of NOT operator with equal (or dif-
ference) test is with Boolean values (meaning a ∈ F2 with
F2 = {0, 1}). This is not a big assumption since condi-
tions, where negations are used, manipulate, most of the
time, Boolean or equivalent values. With the compiler’s bug,
all the following codes are equivalent: ∀a, b ∈ F2, we have
a == b ⇐⇒ !a == b ⇐⇒ a == !b ⇐⇒ !a == !b which,
obviously, leads to issues. A more complex example can be
illustrated with: ! (!a == b). In a non bogus environment,
we have the equivalent conditions:
! (!a == b) ⇐⇒ ! (a 6= b)
⇐⇒ a == b
In the bogus environment of ml compiler, truth equation
should change. It is due to the NOT operator which is not
interpreted correctly. The first NOT is interpreted on the
whole condition while it changes the jump instruction. From
an equality, it is now an inequality. The second NOT (in
the brackets) is not interpreted at all, which leads to the
following conditions:
! (!a == b) ⇐⇒ ! (a == b)
⇐⇒ a 6= b
With this change in logic of program, we can replace a
condition, normally not executed, into one which is now ex-
ecuted. Note the opposite operation is although correct: it
is possible to change a condition which is executed to one
which is no more executed. This is the main point to build
the plot of a backdoor.
3.3 Creation of the backdoor
Using logic bug to change behavior of a targeted appli-
cation is quite simple. We illustrate things with the use of
access check to a resource reserved to administrator. For
real instances, one can think to programs such as runas
or sudo under UNIX subsystem. The goal is to introduce
a flaw in a function supposed to check access rights of
the calling process before continuing potential privileged
functionalities. The simplest example could look like the
one provided in figure 9.
With the previous code, if a regular user calls the
function, it gains access to the privileged function. This is
due to the fact that the NOT operator is not correctly in-
terpreted by the compiler. Finally, ml compiles a condition
close to ”.if caller context.isAdmin == 1” which triggers the
condition, so that the function is stopped. But the code
in figure 9 is wrong for an operational backdoor. Indeed,
if an administrator calls the function, because of the bug,
the legitimate access is now refused. In this case, even the
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Figure 9: Simple backdoor using the compiler’s bug.
simplest checking test would found something goes wrong.
If we introduce a backdoor, this one must keep the original
behavior of the modified code. Inserting a new backdoor
functionality does not mean to remove already present
functionalities.
The solution comes with a small raise of complexity about
the code to backdoor. Continuing the runas example, this
one can check, first, if the user belongs to a group, then if
the couple user-name and password is correct. At that time,
if the user belongs to the group of administrator, access
can be guaranteed. A correct implementation would lead
to check all these operations ones after the others. But, for
optimizing things up, we propose to check is the provided
user-name is administrator or just a regular user (implicitly
supposing there is no other group except administrator or
regular user). Finally, the check of provided password can be
performed. The resulting code can be seen as the following.
Figure 10: Check to let access to provided login/-
password.
The double check of the user affiliation can be justified
by the fact that non administrator user could perform some
task in the coming code or something else, close to that
explanation. The code in figure 10 is the original code to
backdoor. Of course, the main working space is in the
condition. First, we are going to study the condition with
a truth table, according to all possible outputs of values:
Administrator User Password correct Result
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 ?
1 1 1 ?
Note the last two possibilities should never happen. In-
deed, by definition, a user cannot be both administrator and
regular user (ie: non administrator) and even if it was pos-
sible, there is no real definitive answers to provide here. In
a way, these undefined states could be an interesting stop
to exploit our compiler’s bug... Technically, our goal is to
get a regular user (ie: non administrator), with the correct
password of the user account, being executed as an adminis-
trator, in addition to administrator users whose execution is
still guaranteed. First, we are going to modify the condition
in a manner it does not change the logic of the condition but
it introduce our NOT operator. One can write:
Figure 11: Change the condition (but not the logic)
to introduce NOT.
The code in figure 11 introduces the NOT operator
but it does not change the logic of the condition from
a formal point of view. Note that there is many ways,
with the compiler’s bug, to introduce this operator (for
instance, !esi == edi since edi is supposed to be at one).
This introduction is targeted on the esi register since this
one is supposed to contain the Boolean value defining the
belonging of the provided user to the group of regular
users. This is in order to force the misinterpretation the
real membership of the provided user at execution time.
The logic of the condition is to only accept what is de-
fined as true to let privileged functionalities being executed.
With just the last modification, no user (administrator or
not) would be executed. Indeed, the condition is now only
valid if the user is identified as being membership of both
administrator and non administrator group. This is due
to the use of AND operators in the condition. To remove
this obstacle, we can define condition in other order and
by the use of negative logic. Everything which is identified
not to be an authenticated user will be rejected, allowing
the execution to continue otherwise. Of course, because the
undefined state is not supposed to happen in theory, we do
not implement it in our code. A possible solution can be
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seen in code written in figure 12.
Figure 12: Trapped condition.
Condition in figure 12 is conform with the logic of the
original condition in figure 10. It first checks whether the
password is correct or not. If this one is not compliant,
the code jumps directly to the failure part of the function.
The justification of this first check lies in the need to avoid
unnecessary checks if the password is invalid. Then, if the
password is correct, the condition checks if the provided
user is either an administrator or a regular user. This
double check is to officially avoid undefined membership
status of users...
The reality of the compiler’s bug forces the condition to
be interpreted differently. Actually, the sub-condition (!esi
== 1) is interpreted as (esi == 1). Under this condition,
it allows an administrator or a regular user, provided the
password linked to its account, to get access to privileged
functionalities. The following array resumes the truth table
really compiled by the ml.
Password correct User Administrator Result
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
The antepenultimate and the penultimate lines define the
expected result. Either an administrator or a regular user
— correctly authenticated — checks the condition. This
is the design of the backdoor we introduce. It allows one
more hidden case to get access to privileged functionalities
while keeping the original behavior from the condition.
Remaining the case of the last line, this one is not really
relevant, since it is theoretically not expected a single user
can be a member of two groups at the same time. And,
even if it could happen, officially, the condition would give
access if there is admin rights. To some degree, condition
made a choice to privilege admin users, whatever they
belong to another group at the same time... A perfectly
sustainable choice.
At the difference of [11], our code does not appear as need-
lessly complicated. It is perfectly justifiable without betray
its unexpected design. One malicious author could insert
such a code as a patch and justify it by optimization pur-
poses, as we did in this paper. Another difference lies in
the flexibility of our backdoor. It can be introduced in any
condition, changing the logic flow of this one without remov-
ing the original behavior of the condition. To perform the
modification, one can follow these steps:
1. Define the original truth table of the condition ;
2. Write the expected truth table for the new condition ;
3. Build a legitimate condition which follows the last
truth table by the use of NOT operator in an equal
test condition to exploit the bug.
4. CORRECTION OF THE BUG
Once the bug has been discovered, and because it is
potentially critical, it has been transferred to Microsoft
under CVE number CVE-2018-82322. Since the bug is
clearly identified, detection of specific patterns in conditions
is enough to detect potential issues. From that point, many
possibilities are doable. First, the compiler could display
warning or error messages to prevent compilation of such
code. If it does not fix the problem, it allows developers to
be informed about it and to avoid such a dangerous use.
The second possibility is to increase the volume of generated
code for such configuration. As presented in Section 2, the
main problem comes from the lack of a temporary variable.
These two solutions are presented in the current section.
In addition, it was required to inform people about
the necessity to review all their source-codes which used
that compiler. To correct the bug, many solutions exist
to do it. On the first hand, it would be about adding a
warning when the compiler encounters such a construction
(detected as previously bugger). This warning informs a
potential flow in the construction when the negation must
be performed with a temporary variable. On the second
hand, the compiler can insert, by itself, this temporary
variable to correct the logic. With the compiler’s bug, we
are dealing with incorrect code generated in the following
situation.
Figure 13: Initial code to correct.
Correction can be designed in the same way the C
compiler did it in figure 8. By saving original value of the
value or by creating a new one, the NOT operation can
be performed (explicitly by adding a test or just by using
dedicated instructions). In that way, the compiled code
could be generically corrected to something close to the
code displayed in figure 14.
The main idea is to save the negated value in the stack
to use it directly in the original condition. Using stack is
not a big issue since this is the regular procedure to create
2https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/
security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-8232
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Figure 14: Proposition of solution to correct the
bug.
local values for functions. Note this temporary value used
must be removed from the stack whatever the result of the
condition was. It is in order to keep coherency for previous
values already present in the stack.
The decompiled version of the previous code follows
requirement of the condition originally defined by the
developer. The complexity cost is relatively small since
operation on stack are common. No double code displayed
in figures 14 et 15 could be improved to something more
efficient.
Figure 15: Decompiled correction for the proposed
solution.
More than correcting the bug in the compiler by Microsoft,
a large audit of applications developed with that compiler is
mandatory. Indeed, a compiler is a software responsible to
generate other software. It means that other source codes
have been compiled with it and these ones should be au-
dited in order to find bogus constructions in conditions, on
the first hand, and to confirm the original behavior of the
software once this one has been recompiled (since condition
flow could change) on the other hand. Taking into account
that assembly language is used by some firmware builder,
drivers developers or just for tenuous part of critical code,
it can be complicated to update these software since some
code can potentially not be updatable (lake of internet con-
nection, code written in ROM for embedded devices, small
portion of code used in a math library which is part of a big-
ger project...). Including the fact that ml is an old compiler,
it represents a large number of software which have been
made with it by a lot of people. Even if a CVE number
has been assigned and a security update pushed, it could
be hard to fix everything, especially if the source code of
one software has been developed at former time by a com-
pany which has collapsed since that time. In such a case,
a reverse engineering process should be made on compiled
code to check that logic flow for each condition is designed
to perform the task for those it has been designed.
5. CONCLUSION
This bug has been found during the development of
specific processes dedicated to security. If there have
always been debates over the usefulness and performance of
assembly language relative to high-level languages, this one
is still used in industry. Far to be the most common, the
TIOBE index of programming language popularity ranks
assembly language at 15 in February 20183 and its use is
growing these last years4. Just from open-source world, one
can find easily more than one thousandth projects using
MASM in their source code5. We find assembly developers
in the fields of compiler, firmware, security, real-time
simulations or calculation and anti-malware engineering.
All are critical fields and where programs run with high
privileges and full access to user’s data.
After numerous exchanges with Microsoft team, a so-
lution has been implemented to fix the bug. According
to the previous section, several possibilities could be per-
formed, including rejecting the compilation with an error
or building the binary as C compiler does. But, because
assembly language must give to the developer a full control
of what it is compiled and in order to not break backward
compatibility with existing software, Microsoft decided to
correct the bug with the error message. Now, A2154 error
with the message ”syntax error in control-flow directive”
is displayed when such construction in condition is used.
From an operational point of view, recompiling existing
codes with the new version of Visual Studio 2017 (July
2018) is enough to detect a potential use of the vulnerability.
More generally, using a bug in a compiler to introduce
a trap in a software is a nice and smooth manner to get
access to a targeted system in the stealthiest way. From
a specific compiled version dedicated to a specific target
to a wildly used open-source software, possibilities are
endless. Undetectable for humans, perfectly justifiable
for malicious developers, thin and efficient, this type of
backdoor is designed for long term and high efficiency.
Detectable by automatic tests process, these one must be
calibrated to record and take care of suspicious signal or
3https://www.tiobe.com/tiobe-index/
4https://www.tiobe.com/tiobe-index/assembly-language/
5https://searchcode.com/?q=masm&lan=34
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undefined states. Of course, example provided in this paper
is for illustration purpose and it could be possible to detect
it with dedicated tests. But, with no prior knowledge
a backdoor has been inserted, detection by specific test
procedure can be almost impossible to perform. Note
that, even if tests find something tendentious, auditing
source code would not be enough to fix the problem and
it would be even worth to identify the bug as a malicious
trap inserted on purpose... Reverse engineering is the
only solution to understand and fix bug (both from the
targeted software where the trap has been set and the
bugged compiler), but it is not a mass sport and not a basic
skill earned by each developer. Note that it requires that
developers suspect bugs come from compiler and not their
own code to first be able to fix things. A state of mind which
is far to be common if you are not aware it could be possible.
From an operation point of view, such a backdoor is
almost perfect. Especially with the bug provided here,
attacker has the ability to insert new possibilities in any crit-
ical condition targeted without modifying original behavior
of the condition. Bonus, attacker can stop diffusion of the
attack by correcting bug in the compiler, removing the trap
for new compiled version without changing targeted soft-
ware’s source code. Another bonus lies in the difficulty to
update critical pieces of code, most of the time in firmware
and other close to hardware or kernel components. Last
attacks such as Spectre [15] and Meltdown [16] demonstrate
how hard it could be to change firmware in critical pieces
of software. Not using such extreme examples, thinking
about pieces of software in firmware, written in assembly,
sometime years ago, by companies which could not exist
any more, could make impact of such backdoor very critical.
Of course, the goal of this paper is to report this vul-
nerabilities to make it patched as soon as possible. But
it aims to explain how to find such a bug, make it visible
to any developer and alert about how important damage
could be if it was exploited by malicious developers. More
important, it underlines the necessity to not believe blindly
that open-source projects are secure. Even if they are
correctly audited by experts. In the same philosophy than
[11], our work is different since it does not require to use
obfuscation to hide the trap, which make our perfectly
justifiable. Compiler is a milestone in the building proce-
dure of an application and it must be not underestimated
as a potential source of vulnerability. This is not new
since Ken Thompson [12] did it in 1984, by modifying the
compiler and then compiling a trapped code. Here, we
exploit a zero-day vulnerability in the compiler to do the job.
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